March 28, 2003

War Talk

I have been writing about the war recently. It's hard talking “academically” about such a conflict, especially as it is ongoing, but I believe that the way in which this war is developing certainly shows the deep cultural chasm between the Anglo-American, “Old European” and “Arab” mentality. As such, it is a valid topic for this blog.

The US and the UK have not (in recent memory) had to fight a ground war at home. Especially for the US, the horror of war is something that is known only to veterans and not truly known to the masses of the population, whose only exposure to war has been through entertainment.

In the UK, there is definitely the memory of German air raids, but even that does not have the resonance that seeing actual carnage of armed combat does. The people of the UK have not had the experience of watching enemy troops walk in their land.

In contrast, France and Germany remember what war is all too well, as they were both devestated twice by it in the previous century. The younger generations have doubtlessly heard stories from their fathers and grandfathers. How can one compare, e.g., the experience of the average Russian whose fatherland was devestated by the Nazi hordes and who counts victims among his family members with that of the average American, whose ancestors may have imigrated to the US after WWII, and if they have not, in all probability were not involved in it in any significant way? (*)

These different experiences, have shaped different attitudes towards war. It is not surprising that popular support for war is highest in the countries that have least experienced it.

As for the Iraqis, it appears that the hopes of “dancing crowds” or “mass surrenders” have been just that: hopes. Anyone who is familiar with the psychology of the region knows full well two of its key features: (i) the terrific fatalism of the Muslim religion, which inspires people to face even their own death with indifference, (ii) the sense of pride, both individual and national pride which hates being imposed upon by others.

Western commentators are buffled by the fact that the Iraqis are not understanding that the US are “trying to help”. But, this assumes that the Iraqis will use the West's Utilitarian reasoning and choose the US over Saddam as the lesser of two evils. But, in fact, as we see throughout the Arab world (and Iraqis are Arabs), the stronger feeling by far is indignation, a sense of desperation at the injustice, and wounded pride.

Another point of cultural disconnection between the coalition and the Iraqi world view is in its view of civilians. For the US, the civilians are the ones who stayed at home (in the US), whereas the troops went to fight. The separation between the two was clear (because of geography). But, for most nations which have faced war within their own borders, there is essentially no such distinction, because Anglo-American civilians have never had the experience of physically having to defend their home countries against actual ground troops present in them.

For countries like Greece, Serbia, Russia, or many Arab states, which have had such an experience, the notion that civilians will stay idle while the fighting is done by “uniformed soldiers” is not only absurd, but mildly offensive. What kind of man, having the ability to bear arms, stays idle when his country is invaded?

Of course, the various war supporters are trying to explain Iraqi civilian involvement in the war as the result of coercion by Saddam's “regime”. Maybe that occurs sometimes. But, I will venture that civilian participation is in most cases voluntary.

The coalition is hoping that they will be able to create a democratic Iraq. I hope they succeed, but I doubt it. Anyone who succeeds Saddam will always have the charge against him (in the minds of the Iraqis) of being a collaborator who owes his his power to the invaders. That is hardly the position that will be conducive to long-term prosperity.

The US-led occupation will eventually face a dilemma. If its duration is prolonged (as it might have to; after all, the US will definitely not want to leave the job half done this time), then it will spark resentment, and postpone or weaken the position of the new Iraqi regime. At the same time, US casualties will doubtlessly continue after Iraq is pacified, creating an unwelcome situation for President Bush as he moves towards re-election.

At the other side of the fence, if the US leaves too early, it might face a resurgence of a hostile regime, or a counter-coup by Saddam loyalists. Moreover, there will be a new wave of international outcry: that the US came, got their man, and left, not making enough to repair the damage they have caused.

The war was a bet that President Bush's administration took. One hopes that it will turn out as best as could be hoped for. But, judging from past history, and the conflicting cultures involved, I fear that it will most likely not be the idyllic scenario which was used to gain support for it.

(*) While decisive from a military standpoint, US involvement in WWII had proportionally minor casualties, and most of the US population never was anywhere close to combat action.

Posted by Dienekes at March 28, 2003 01:35 AM | PermaLink
Comments

Good points about the huge difference between American (and to some extent British) experience of war vs that of continental Europe or the Middle East. I would add a few details, though:

American casualties in WWII were relatively low, but the vast majority of Americans living today have (or had) a father, grandfather, or uncle who fought in the war; nearly one-tenth of the entire population served in the military, including almost every able-bodied male born between (very roughly) 1910 and 1927. Both my father's elder brothers did, and he would have been in the invasion of Japan, had it taken place. So we get our share of war stories.

Immigration to the US was severely restricted in 1924; the restrictions were not lifted until 1965, so there is not yet a large proportion of the population descended from recent immigrants. (Disclaimer: like many other aspects of American demographics, this varies widely by region; lumping the entire US together statistically often produces drastically misleading results.)

In prior 20th-century wars, American servicemen tended to view themselves as something else first -- usually their peacetime occupation -- and soldiers second. Presumably this is because most of them were drafted. With an all-volunteer professional military, this self-image may have shifted. At the same time, there is an American tradition going all the way back to the Revolution in which virtually every armed adult male is regarded as a potential defender of the homeland. This does not seem to me to differ from your assessment: "What kind of man, having the ability to bear arms, stays idle when his country is invaded?"

At this point, however, other regional differences appear: Southern American culture is much more "militaristic" than is the case elsewhere in the country. African-Americans are also more likely to have military connections. Antiwar sentiment is far more prevalent on the coasts than in the Midwest, South, or intermountain West.

Finally, it's good to read a relatively dispassionate discussion of the risks involved in the Iraq war and its aftermath. It's easy to say, as so many do, that the risks are too large to manage, or too small to worry about. But in the real world, we have to deal with them in a constructive way.

Posted by: Jay Manifold at March 28, 2003 06:11 PM

Thanks for this information. The two main points of difference are, I think (i) the casualty/population ratio, and (ii) the average direct involvement that people (both civilians and not) had with the war; for example, most of the female population of the US has probably had very little if any direct involvement with any type of war.

Also, let's take the example of Japan, which (as an island) was shielded from the experience of war in Japan itself before Pearl Harbor. Consider how drastic the transformation of the militaristic pre-WWII culture has been towards pacifism as the result of the WWII bombing, and esp. the nuclear bombs. In general people who've suffered war most intimately are most unwilling to repeat it. Until, war fades out of historical memory, that is.

Posted by: Dienekes at March 28, 2003 06:27 PM

An intuitively attractive notion. But there is a counterexample: the American South was devastated in the Civil War -- one-quarter of all white males of combat age were killed, and so many of the rest were maimed that an entire generation of Southern women came to consider any remaining man with both arms and both legs to be unusually attractive. But the regional culture is still quite pro-military and statistically significantly more violent; I have read that the homicide rate among rural Southern white males is 4x that of rural Northern white males. It seems to have an "honor/shame" element. I don't pretend to understand this, having been raised just a bit too far north to have been exposed to it.

Best book I've read on regional differences in the US is Joel Garreau's (now slightly dated) The Nine Nations of North America. I live in one of the "capitals."

Posted by: Jay Manifold at March 28, 2003 07:32 PM

Interesting counter-example. I think that there are various "components" to a population's attitudes towards violence, and towards war. Experience of war is one of them, which is superimposed over other cultural influences. One might need to look at these other components present in the US to account for the intra-US differences.

Also, I think that sometimes, the experience of war may lead to more hunger for war, esp. if the population thinks that they've been "wronged". I think there is still some lingering antipathy in the south for the outcome of the Civil War, or for example Germany's WWI experience was not sufficient to avert WWII.

I'm quite interested in finding out how the North/South dichotomy in the US emerged. I suspect that it was partly an environmental result (in the broadest sense), but was their an ethnic origin differential between the two that might explain part of the gap?

Posted by: Dienekes at March 28, 2003 09:25 PM


Although itīs not my country, regarding North/South dychotomy in the US, I only know that ethnically, there is an element of considerable importance of scotish and irish blood in the South, apart from french Louissiana (I don't know the statistics nor the source of thisinformation) I believe this has led some people to consider this as a genuine celtic influence in Southern ideosyncracy.
If one listens to southern white music I would say the relation is quite evident. Around two years ago I saw a documentary (Filma&Arts Channel I think)on the incredible influence irish music had had in the South.
Another dychotomy element (which makes the Southern spirit all the much similar to Southern American cultures) is that of its rooted rural society, aristocratic, based on the bond between land and family, and in its Plantation Clanwise system: pyramidal and solidary (like our Encomienda), nonetheless the atrocities of slavery.
I've also been told that southern impor-tant families were much more Episcopalian than Protestant and that it was quite usual for them to put their children into catholic schools.
So its not only the geography, the climate, the race but also the religous upbringing. In fact,
a different culture in a different land.

Posted by: Fernando Salas at March 29, 2003 12:25 PM

More recommended reading -- Albion's Seed is supposed to be an excellent explanation of regional cultural differences in the US, arising from different waves of immigration from the British Isles. I regret to report, however, that I have not actually read it.

Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, published in 1835, has some astonishingly relevant comments about the North-South dichotomy in the US; very broadly speaking, he perceived Northerners as more technical and Southerners as having more of what we would today call "soft skills," or perhaps "showmanship." This difference has declined due to internal migration and the scalability of high technology -- Dallas, for example, is one of the most "wired" cities in the country.

I'm from a border state (Missouri) and live in an area (Jackson County) which was the scene of a decade of savage guerilla warfare, starting several years before the Civil War. Most of my ancestors who were alive in 1860 were living in Iowa and Illinois, and one of my great-great-grandfathers died in the war, fighting for the Union. But it is mathematically highly likely that one or more of my other great-great-grandfathers fought for the South. The most prominent remaining cultural divisions I see in this region are not North/South, but urban/rural. But that's another topic altogether ...

Posted by: Jay Manifold at April 2, 2003 07:14 AM
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